Special Standing Committee

[Mr. George Stevenson in the Chair]

Adoption and Children Bill

Clause 56 - Offence

Amendment made: No. 202, in page 32, line 33, leave out 'or 55(4)'.—[Jacqui Smith.] 
 Clause 56, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57 - Disclosing information to adopters

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 52, in page 32, line 37, leave out
'As soon as practicable after the making of an adoption order'
 and insert 
'At the time of making'.
 Good morning, Mr. Stevenson. I trust that you had a fortifying recess and that you are refreshed and ready to deal with the rest of the Bill. 
 Clause 57 is about the disclosure of information to adopters. No doubt, the Minister is geared up to say that we have already dealt with that, but in the last, rather rushed, sitting before the recess, when we started debating the raft of clauses—53 to 62—dealing with access to information of different types, we were faced with a number of 11th-hour Government amendments. 
 I said then that it was all rather confusing, and I see from Hansard and from the fateful letter that she provided to the Committee on 13 December that the Minister agrees that it is an especially complex part of the Bill. It is therefore slightly annoying, Mr. Stevenson—I wonder whether any approaches have been made to you on the subject—that there has been a substantial rewrite of those clauses, including clause 57. If I understand the Minister's intentions correctly, Government Members will vote against clause 57 stand part, having already replaced it with new clause 6—a new clause of which the Committee had very little notice before agreeing it during the last sitting before the recess. 
 Whenever amendments are used substantially to rewrite parts of the Bill because of a change of heart—a welcome one, in this case—comprehensive explanatory notes should be provided to explain Ministers' thinking, and those clauses should be written in a draft form that includes those amendments, which would make the changes easier to follow. We are now considering an amendment to clause 57, but the Government have tabled an amendment to delete the whole clause—and amendment that has not been selected because it is 
 technically wrong. My guess is that the clause has been superseded by new clause 6, which we still think is inadequate. 
 What I am attempting to do this morning is not easy. I want to amend clause 57 and I am happy with the amendment, but I fear that it will be blown out of the water because the Government have already inserted a new clause that sort of relates to the subject but is wholly inadequate. That may sound confusing, but we are in a confusing position. I wonder, Mr. Stevenson, whether the Minister has made representations to you about making further information available to the Committee.

George Stevenson: I am advised that the answer to that direct question is no.

Tim Loughton: I am not surprised, Mr. Stevenson, but it is a shame. Perhaps the Minister will make further information available to the Committee. She said that this part of the Bill is complicated, and it is to be changed fundamentally. It would, at the very least, have been courteous of the Government to give the Committee a full explanation of their thinking when their amendments were tabled and before we started discussing them at our last sitting before the recess. Had they done so, Opposition Members would have known on what basis we could table amendments to influence the Government's thinking.

Jonathan Djanogly: I agree with my hon. Friend. Given the Government and Opposition amendments before us, it will be impossible to consider properly this messy series of clauses. I note from the amendment paper that the Government have tabled amendment No. 203 to delete clause 57, but the amendment is not on the selection list.

George Stevenson: It has not been selected.

Tim Loughton: My hon. Friend's comment demonstrates the confusion about this part of the Bill. We shall progress, but events will show the inadequacies of the Committee system when at the very last moment at which amendments can be tabled, a Committee is faced with a complete overhaul of the Government's intentions.
 To return to the amendment, in her letter of 13 December—afternoon—to the Committee, the Minister said: 
''we have decided to table amendments to the relevant provisions in the Bill to provide an enabling power through regulations to require adoption agencies to release certain information to prospective adopters at three key stages''.
 She then gave rough details of what those stages were likely to be. However, the Government have tabled no amendments; they simply want to get rid of the clause and to replace it with a new clause, and they will do so, provided the Committee votes accordingly. 
 Theoretically, new clause 6 will replace clause 57. I have a complaint about an issue that some hon. Members, including me, failed to recognise when we first saw the amendments in the last-minute rush the day before the recess. The new clause states: 
''Regulations under section 9 may require adoption agencies in prescribed circumstances to disclose in accordance with the regulations prescribed information to prospective adopters.''
 I take issue with the words ''may require''. Making available information about medical records and other matters is such an important part of the adoption process that ''may require'' is not good enough. Furthermore, those words are connected with regulations that we have not yet seen and of which we have been given only a rough idea in a letter that was, in any case, flawed. That does not give me sufficient confidence that what the Minister has sort of suggested she wants will achieve what Opposition Members want. 
 Let me state the reasons why amendment No. 52 should change the wording of clause 57 to make it clear that it is crucial that information should be available at the time of matching, when the adoption process is in full flight. We suggest removing the words 
''As soon as practicable after the making of an adoption order''
 and inserting the words 
''At the time of making''
 the adoption order. That is the key to the amendment.

Julian Brazier: Before my hon. Friend moves on to the detail, he might consider further the point about ''may'' or ''might''. Ironically, the new clause appears to water down the provisions: new clause 6 says ''may'', but clause 57, which it replaces, says ''must'', at line 38.

Tim Loughton: That is correct. We want to retain clause 57 because it contains phrases such as ''must disclose'', which make matters absolutely clear. There is no ''may'', or ''regulations may prescribe''—the word is ''must'', and we want to retain that. The bone of contention is when the information is to be made available. It should be available much earlier in the adoption process. I shall give some examples of why that is so important.
 To be fair to the Minister, she admitted in her letter that there had been concerns about and representations on making sufficient information available to prospective adopters at an early stage. That is supposedly why she came up with the changes, but we feel that they do not go far enough. One representation that all members of the Committee saw was from the Children's Society. Referring to the provision in clause 57 that required information to be given after the adoption order was made, it stated: 
''This is too late. In order to consider whether they are able to care properly for a child, adopters must have all the necessary information about the child at the outset of the placement so that they can make an informed decision about whether to proceed. A finding of many disruption meetings is that a contributory factor to the breakdown of a placement is the lack of information given to adopters at an early stage. Anything that can be done to prevent the damaging effects of disruption on young people must be pursued.''—[Official Report, Special Standing Committee, 21 November 2001; c. 236–37.]
 I agree wholeheartedly. 
 The Adoption Forum, referring to the same problem in clause 57, stated: 
''without sufficient information at the time of matching . . . the prospective family''
 cannot 
''make an informed decision about whether they could or would want to become the child's parents. For example, a family may not feel it could deal with a child who had been sexually abused.''—[Official Report, Special Standing Committee, 21 November 2001; c. 169.]
 If social services departments hold that information—such matters, of course, are sometimes revealed only when a child settles with a new and trusted family—it should be provided at the start, the Adoption Forum suggested. Again, I agree. 
 Barnardo's is an interesting case, as it was recently pulled up for not providing information. It stated: 
''We cannot understand why the proposed timing for this is not consistent with current practice or the requirement of Regulation 12 (1983—Adoption Agencies Regulations). Adoptive parents need written information about the child and their background when they are considering whether to proceed with a placement not after the order has been granted. The Department of Health will be aware that, together with a local authority, we were recently sued for allegedly failing to provide full information at the time of a placement, which subsequently disrupted after the adoption order. We were successful in refuting the claim and the case was dismissed but we believe that we could have been legitimately accused of negligence had the information not been provided until after the child was adopted, as required by clause 57''.—[Official Report, Special Standing Committee, November 2001; c. 355.]
 Mr. Robin Harritt, who has been in communication with me and made submissions to the Committee, has personal experience of adoption, having been adopted himself. He has spent a long time trying to contact his several siblings, with partial success. He said: 
''It might interest the Committee to know that I have only just received some of my personal medical information from Barnardo's after ten years of complaints and legal threat, I still await from Barnardo's, the kind of information that Ms Gunn-Rosso required from Nugent Care''.—[Official Report, Special Standing Committee, November 2001; c. 295.]
 That was a well known case. Mr. Harritt continues: 
''In my search for my siblings I have found that one of my brothers died in his early thirties, from coronary thrombosis, apparently my maternal grandfather also died from a similar disease, everyone in our family needs to know this. I am aware of the service provided by the National Health Service Central Records department at Smedly Hydro, but very few other people who might want to make use of it, have.''— [Official Report, Special Standing Committee, November 2001; c. 298.]
 Mr. Harritt draws my attention to a case that the BBC is taking up in a documentary. The subject of a news item on the internet last week, the case of the Gorry family is interesting and pertinent to our endeavours. The news item stated: 
''Losing one member of your family in tragic circumstances is devastating, but when a third of your extended family is wiped out, it is a catastrophe.
This is what happened to the Gorry family.
But it was not until a doctor in Australia diagnosed a rare heart disorder in a member of the younger generation, the family realised some carry a life-threatening inherited rogue gene . . . Father-of-two Neil Halliday, who appears to have escaped the disorder, discovered the 'catastrophe' while researching his family tree . . . he discovered that nearly a third''—
 of his family— 
''had died suddenly while young.
He has since discovered that his brother Kevin, sister Yvonne, mother Phyllis . . . and other members of the family were the victims of Long QT syndrome—a type of sudden adult death syndrome''
 Mr. Halliday is now desperately trying to make contact with all the members of the family—some of 
 whom have been adopted and with whom he has no links—to warn them that there is a serious family genetic problem of which he and, he assumes, other family members have until now had no knowledge. The condition can be treated using, among other things, beta blockers. 
 Two alarming aspects of that motivated the amendment, which would emphasis the importance of providing the information as early as possible. The first is medical: it is essential that prospective adoptive parents know about a prospective adopted child's medical condition, so that they can assess whether they can cope with it. Later, it is essential that those parents are in possession of as full a medical record as possible, in case the sort of genetic disorder is present that could have a serious impact on the health of the child and his or her siblings in future. People should not have to wait for 10 or 20 years for medical records. It should be implicit that when a match is made, a full medical history is available to the prospective adopters so that the well-being of the child can be properly attended to. 
 The second aspect was mentioned by Professor Triseliotis, who spoke about his work in adoption during the witness sittings of the Committee. He mentioned the case of a child who had been abused at bath time. The child was subsequently adopted, but went berserk whenever his new parents tried to give him a bath. They could not understand the problem. Of course, the problem was that that child associated bath time with being abused and the horrific events of an obviously tragic case of abuse in his original home. 
 Surely it is essential that prospective adopters know about such things when a match is being made. Then, they can fully assimilate all the facts about a child and determine whether they can cope with him and give him an adequate environment. That is especially important if the child has a range of special needs and comes from a rather murky background. There should be no ''mays'', no ''it will come along if the regulations allow for it''. At as early a stage as possible, full medical, behavioural and other pertinent records on the prospective adoptive child should be made available to the prospective adoptive parents. Only on that basis can they hope to make an informed decision on whether they can offer the appropriate environment for that child. Only then can they hope to be in possession of all the facts that might affect the future medical well-being of that child and other siblings with whom contact might be made in future. 
 That would be in everyone's interests. It would not involve an enormous amount of extra work, because if the work is done properly, there may be savings later on the pain, angst and requirements for extra support—and the associated extra costs—if the placement breaks down because all the facts were not properly made available and assimilated out in the first place. That is what we are trying to achieve. 
 I appreciate that the Minister has gone some way to recognising the importance of such a provision, but, there is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) mentioned, a serious flaw: the new clause waters down the Bill's good intention. 
 Furthermore, the issue of timing needs to be beefed up. That is what the amendment is designed to achieve, and I strongly commend it to the Committee.

Julian Brazier: I rise to reinforce the argument made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton). Possibly because I enjoyed the Christmas break too much, I did not fully follow the debate, and I am a little puzzled. On information, we heard some of the clearest and most eloquent testimony that I have ever heard in a Committee. I shall not bore hon. Members by repeating the points that my hon. Friend drew from that testimony.
 People who have adopted have repeatedly made the point that it is crucial that they have all the information available on the child. I shall refer to a constituency case that I have mentioned before. The problems in that case did not relate to information, because the couple were given the information, but the Committee will be able to see what problems would have occurred had they not been given that information immediately on taking on the children. 
 The case involved two young lads, one of whom had been kept locked in a cellar for six years and was almost unable to speak; the other had been left outside in cold weather so frequently that he developed gangrene in both feet and came close to having to have them amputated, although in the end, doctors managed to save them. Knowing that he would become upset if he got at all cold, the mother would immediately warm his feet. That may sound a little bizarre, and is something that she would not have thought of had she not been given the facts of the case, but the boy found it very consoling. 
 The case of the poor boy who had been kept for six years in the cellar is more complicated. He had almost no ability to speak, and if the adoptive parents had not been told the ghastly circumstances in which the child had been kept by the people who had passed for his parents, he might have appeared to be completely stupid. In fact, there is no evidence that the child had any genetic failings: if one is shut off from all communication for the first six years of one's life, one does not learn to talk. It is a difficult challenge to teach a child aged six to talk. 
 My hon. Friend's two main arguments are crucial. First, full information must be provided and, secondly, it must be provided in good time. Our courts do not allow the introduction of hearsay evidence. Although Parliament is not controlled by that rule, I will not name names because of the seriousness of the matter. However, people involved in adoption for whom I have great respect tell me that—occasionally, and off the record—professionals have said, ''If we allowed the parents to have all the facts on some of these cases, we'd never get the little blighters adopted at all.'' That is a serious allegation to make about those professionals, but I shall not name names because I cannot actually prove that they said such a palpably untrue thing. 
 Every member of the Committee supports the central objective of the Bill, which is to get more children adopted. The sort of approach reflected in such remarks is completely unacceptable and wrong. 
 My saintly constituents who took on those two little boys knew everything about them—and there is not much worse that one can know about a child than that he was locked in the dark for six years and cannot talk. We owe the people who take on those potential emotional tragedies, turn them round and give them loving homes, the right to know everything that has gone wrong in the child's life, as far as the agency involved is able to provide that information. 
 I apologise for not going into more detail, but I am a little confused about the mechanics of what is going on. It strikes me as extraordinary that we are moving from tight original wording to much looser wording. I look forward to the Minister's response.

Jacqui Smith: I welcome you, Mr. Stevenson, and the rest of the Committee back after the break.
 I begin by responding to the points made by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham about the extent of the information on amendments that has been made available by the Government. I remind the Committee that we made information available both by circulating a letter to members of the Committee and by tabling the amendments and new clauses setting out the changes before Christmas. Although, as has been said, we were not able to discuss them on the Thursday before the recess, the Government gave Committee members and others a clear idea of the our intentions. 
 Hon. Members will remember and the record will show that I spoke at considerable length in Committee about how the Government intended the provisions to fit together to deliver the changes that we were making in response to evidence that emerged during the Committee's proceedings. I understand that hon. Members might have returned after the break not quite as immersed in the Bill as they were before, but we have made significant efforts to spell out the future position and explain our proposed changes. 
 As the hon. Gentleman said, amendment No. 52 is to be made to a clause that the Government, consequent on other changes that we are making, will propose should not stand part of the Bill. I have some sympathy with the issues raised by Opposition Members, but none with the idea that we have not already made explicit the way in which the Government intend to deal with concerns about what information is provided for prospective adopters, and when it is provided. We made that clear in the debate before Christmas, in my letter to the Committee, and in the other information that I have made available to the Committee. 
 We were aware that during the Committee's hearings several witnesses had stated the importance of adopters receiving full and appropriate information about a child during the matching process, and of supporting the adoptive placement well in advance of the adoption order being made. A number of witnesses suggested that the Bill did not address that clearly enough, commenting that clause 57, referring to the provision of information following the adoption order, 
 did not make sufficiently clear the need for information to be provided before the stage of the adoption order being made was reached. Introducing new clause 6 and explaining it enabled us to make that explicit. 
 We will set out in regulations that information should be made available to prospective adopters before the stage of the adoption order. We entirely agree that it is crucial that adopters receive full information during matching to help the placement to succeed. That is not a change of policy. It was always our intention to use the various regulation-making powers under the Bill to provide for that, but in the light of the points made, we thought it appropriate to amend the Bill to make the intention clear. That is why we propose to remove clause 57, while new clause 6 makes it clear that the general regulation-making power under clause 9 may be used to set out the key stages at which adoption agencies are to provide information to prospective adopters, and the information that they are obliged to provide. 
 For the benefit of the Committee and in view of the break that we have had, I shall explain what we envisage being provided at the relevant stages. That should overcome some of the concerns that have been expressed by Opposition Members. First, in the light of the intervention by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), it might be worth while—although it is not my role—to set out what I understand to be the process by which clauses are removed. An amendment is tabled to remove a particular clause; it appears on the amendment paper, thus making the Government's intention clear, but it does not have to be dealt with as an amendment, because the outcome can be achieved by moving that the clause not stand part of the Bill. There has not been a Government error, although the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham made such a mischievous suggestion—dare I say that he might be slightly bad tempered following his holiday? The procedure adopted is perfectly in order.

Jonathan Djanogly: Holiday moods notwithstanding, given all the amendments, it would have been helpful if the Committee had received a redraft of all the information and the provisions, along with some accompanying notes. In effect, we are starting from scratch and have been left with a confusing series of amendments.

Jacqui Smith: Without claiming too much for my letter, the intention behind it and the amendments was to set out with greater clarity than is often found in explanatory notes our intentions and the way in which the provisions would fit together. I am sure that in the intervals between celebrations during the festive period, the hon. Gentleman pored over the amendments that were available before the holiday to ensure that he was clear about what is intended. Nevertheless, as I proceed today, I shall try again to make it clear to the Committee what the provisions will achieve.

Elfyn Llwyd: I appreciate that the new clause is important. Why does
 the word ''may'' appear in the first line, rather than ''shall''? Also—and I ask this not mischievously but for information—may we have examples of the ''prescribed information'' referred to in the new clause?

Jacqui Smith: We have previously debated the use of the words ''may'' or ''shall'' in relation to regulations. I made it clear that using the word ''may'' does not imply that the Government will try to evade their responsibility to provide regulations. When discussing new clause 6, I explained—in a way that I thought made matters clearer—what we intend to include in the regulations; however, I shall explain again. We intend to use the powers under new clause 6 to ensure that, through regulations, we prescribe that agencies must provide certain information to adopters and prospective adopters at three different stages.
 First, a summary report on the child would be prepared at the linking stage, when the prospective adopters are first visited by the child's social worker and the adoption social worker. The report would provide information about, for example, the child's appearance, his family circumstances, the part played in his life by his birth parents, his home environment, why he was taken into care or is being given up for adoption, his behaviour, how he interacts with other children, how he relates to adults, and his current care status. It should not contain identifying information about anyone other than the child, and adopters would be asked to agree to keep the information provided confidential. 
 At the next stage, a full matching report on the child will provide the prospective adopters with all the information that they need to decide whether to go ahead with the match. That report would include much of the information that Opposition Members have highlighted as information that prospective adopters should have, both to enable them to make a decision about the adoption and to ensure its success. Included in that report will be a full description of the child's history, needs, problems, progress at school and in care, personality and behaviour, supported by medical, psychiatric, psychological and educational information. 
 At the third stage, if the prospective adopters want to proceed to make preparations for the placement, they should be provided with a written proposal setting out the terms of the placement. The proposal should include details of proposed financial and other support arrangements, as well as details about any agreement about contact arrangements. If the child's birth family agrees in writing, life story books, which may include birth certificates, photograph albums and family trees, may be passed to the prospective adopters, who would be asked to sign an undertaking to keep the identifying information confidential. 
 Although amendment No. 52 does not relate to this point, the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham referred to information that might subsequently become available. We will ensure that adoption agencies pass on relevant information to adopters when such information is obtained after the adoption order has been made.

Julian Brazier: As I understand it, the Minister is arguing in favour of replacing a primary structure with a regulatory framework that will allow a detailed and sensible approach to be taken. However, she has not explained why she cannot simply table an amendment to allow the Government to make regulations while still providing the stronger primary underpinning of the original clause. What she proposes may be excellent for as long as those regulations are in force, but a future Minister—one who is lobbied by objecting agencies—could strike them out with a statutory instrument. Why not have both the strong primary underpinning and the regulations?

Jacqui Smith: The evidence to which we are responding suggested that there was insufficiently strong primary underpinning, and that the underpinning that it would be possible or appropriate to include in primary legislation could not spell out the procedures in the same amount of detail as could be included in regulations. I do not imagine that the hon. Gentleman is arguing that all the details that I have outlined should be included in the Bill. That would be inappropriate because it would make responding to changes or improving the procedures in future much more difficult.

Julian Brazier: Will the Minister cover the points made by the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd)? The word ''might'' could be replaced with the word ''shall'' and examples of exemptions could be given so that exemptions are not allowed to blossom in regulations, as so often happens under definitions set out in Bills.

Jacqui Smith: I do not know what the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy thinks, but I thought that I responded fully to his questions. First, on the issue of ''must'', ''shall'' and ''may'', I reinforced points that had previously been made about the wording appropriate for regulations. Secondly, I explained clearly what information, prescribed by regulations, should be provided at various different stages. The hon. Member for Canterbury seems to think that I was talking about information that should not be made available. On the contrary, the prescribed information is information that is to be made available; it is not proscribed information, as in ''a proscribed organisation''.
 Apart from the fact that it would have implications for other provisions, there is another problem with the proposal simply to amend clause 57. The clause refers to information that may become available after the adoption order is made. As I explained clearly, the Government and stakeholders are rightly concerned about information made available in the run-up to the making of an adoption order. I have made clear the proposed changes to ensure that prospective adopters receive full information in advance of the adoption order, and that adoption agencies continue to pass on relevant information after the order is made. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton: I am always glad when the Minister describes me as mischievous, as it is usually a euphemism for the fact that she has been caught out,
 as she has been on this occasion. However, it was slightly ungenerous of her to describe me as bad tempered. Perhaps I was somewhat overgenerous in saying that her intentions were in the right direction, even though they did not go far enough.
 If I appeared bad tempered, it was because of the Government's distinct lack of courtesy to the Committee in not providing us with the information that we need at the appropriate time. We received the amendments to this part of the Bill at the last minute. They were not available to hon. Members until Monday—the day before the Committee debated the amendments—because they had been tabled at the last moment on a non-sitting Friday. It was discourteous to sneak them in like that. Committee members had minimal time to consider them, and it was too late for us to table further amendments based on the Government's change of heart. Many Committee members and many outside bodies that have lobbied hard on this subject will be justified in feeling angry about the discourteous way in which the Minister has treated the Committee. 
 Furthermore, such practices are not good for the Committee. There are problems with the wording of the Government amendments, as I have already described. We should be in a position to apprise ourselves of the adequacy of amendments as early as possible. The Minister has offered no apology for how the Committee has been treated and steadfastly refuses to provide full explanatory notes about fundamental changes to the Bill. She said that she spoke at length about clause 7 during the last sitting of the Committee before the recess, but what she said amounted to less than two columns in Hansard. She has now reiterated the contents of the letter sent to us on 13 December, but that is not enough to allay our fears. 
 On the issue of ''may'', ''must'' and ''shall'', if the Government were happy to use the word ''must'' to emphasise how important it is that certain information should be made available to prospective adopters, why will they not use the word ''must'' in their new clause? That represents a substantial watering down of the requirements on adoption agencies. However strong the intentions behind regulations, ''may require'' does not mean that some less scrupulous adoption agencies and local authorities that want problem children to be adopted as soon as possible might not operate a strict requirement to make all the relevant information available to the prospective adopters at the appropriate time, yet such information gives the best chance of a successful placement.

Jacqui Smith: A favourable interpretation of the hon. Gentleman's harping on about ''must'' and ''may'' is that he has not given a proper context to the use of those words. The unfavourable interpretation is that he is trying to create an issue that does not exist.
 The use of the word ''must'' in the clause does not mean ''must produce regulations'' but relates to the phrase 
''must disclose to the adopters any of the section 53 information''.
 I shall stand corrected if I am wrong, but I believe that nowhere in the Bill is there a clause that says that the Government must produce regulations. The regulations, as secondary legislation, set out the information that must be provided and at what point it must be provided, so it is wrong to suggest that the use of the words ''may produce regulations'' is equivalent to the use of the words 
''must disclose . . . information''.

Tim Loughton: Part of the problem is that we still have not seen the regulations and shall not see them for many months after the Committee has concluded its proceedings. That is what causes confusion and makes us sceptical that what the Minister says ''may'' be produced will be produced in an adequate form, and that that will achieve what she says it ''may'' achieve. Those things absolutely must be achieved. The measures need to be beefed up.
 The more the Minister spoke, the more confused I became about what the end results may be. I do not know how much of a requirement there is to produce the regulations and how forceful those regulations will be in ensuring that adoption agencies provide all the information required at the appropriate time. The point is important and, as the Government did not properly address it in the complete shambles of new clauses and amendments that they tabled before the recess, I ask my colleagues to support the amendment. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 8.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Jacqui Smith: I rise to argue that the clause should not stand part of the Bill. It requires adoption agencies to disclose prescribed information to adopters
''As soon as practicable after the making of an adoption order''.
 We had a significant discussion about the fact that the clause will be replaced by new clause 6, which makes it clear that the general regulation-making power under clause 9 may be used to set out the key stages at which adoption agencies are to provide information to prospective adopters and the information that they are to be obliged to provide. Given that we have done that, as outlined in the previous debate, the clause should not stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: I am keen that the clause should remain part of the Bill, even though it has not been amended as Opposition Members wanted. At least the word ''must'' would be retained, and we could return to the provision on Report and beef it up as required.
 The Government have handled the issue badly. If they had made their intentions clear at the start and done us the courtesy of providing the extra information and explanatory notes that we have been going on about, we could have avoided this mess. They are guilty of gross discourtesy to the Committee and, on that basis, we shall vote to retain clause 57 in its entirety, with a view to amending it later. 
 Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 8.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 57 disagreed to.

Clause 58 - Disclosing information to adopted adult

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 204, in page 33, line 10, leave out from 'receive' to 'from' in line 11.

George Stevenson: With this we may discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 205 and 207.
 Amendment No. 7, in page 33, line 20, leave out subsection (6).

Jacqui Smith: Clause 58 outlines the conditions on the disclosure to an adopted adult of information held by the courts or by adoption agencies. With new clauses 7 and 8, it spells out our new proposals on disclosure of protected information. We made it clear when we introduced the Bill in October that the provisions on access to information were new and that we would welcome views on whether they struck the right balance. Following the weight of representations and with the benefit of having set up a Special Standing Committee to hear evidence, we are making significant changes to the provisions.
 The clause deals with the conditions for the disclosure of information about birth records held by the court. Under current law the adopted adult has a right, provided by section 51 of the Adoption Act 1976, to obtain information from the Registrar-General that enables him to access a copy of his birth certificate, which identifies his birth parents and their address at the time of the birth. The only exception is when the Registrar-General decides to withhold the information on public policy grounds; in such cases, the adopted person can challenge the Registrar-General's decision by recourse to the High Court. 
 We have reviewed the existing right, taking into account the views of stakeholders and others and the 
 concerns raised about the very small number of cases where unfettered access to birth records could pose a significant risk to the birth parent. Under the amended clause, the adopted adult will retain the right to access the information that he needs to enable him to obtain a copy of his birth certificate. We have broadly replicated but improved on the current legal position. The route of access will now be through the adoption agency. 
 On making a request, the adopted adult would be able to obtain the information that he needs in order to acquire a copy of his birth certificate from his adoption agency. The only exception would be cases in which the adoption agency considered that exceptional circumstances justified recourse to the courts to withhold information, such as when there was a potential serious risk to the safety of those identified. In such a case, the adoption agency would have to seek the High Court's permission not to disclose the information. The High Court would make an order only if it were satisfied that the circumstances were exceptional. I hope that that change will allay the concerns that have been expressed, while still providing a safeguard whereby a court may give its consent, in exceptional circumstances, for information to be withheld. 
 Amendment No. 204 amends clause 58(2), which provides that an adopted person has the right, at his request, to receive the information that is provided to his adoptive parents under clause 57. Under the Bill as originally drafted, that is the information that the adopters would receive at the time of the adoption order, but clause 57 has now been removed, to be replaced by new clause 6 for prospective adopters; consequently, the reference to section 57 information needs to be omitted. 
 Amendment No. 205 will amend clause 58 to provide that the adopted person has a right, at his request, to receive the information that is necessary for him to obtain a certified copy of his birth certificate, unless the High Court orders otherwise. That is the intention that I outlined at the beginning. New subsection (2)(a) inserted by the amendment indicates that the High Court may make an order withholding the information if the circumstances are exceptional, and makes it clear that that would be done on an application by the adoption agency. The amendment also provides, in new subsection (2)(b), for the adopted adult to have a right to any prescribed information disclosed to the adopters by the agency under new clause 6. 
 Finally, amendment No. 207 removes subsections (5) and (6) of clause 58 because the disclosure of protected information is now provided for in new clauses 7 and 8, to be discussed later, the intentions behind which I outlined in response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Huntingdon in the sitting before Christmas and set out in my letter. That is the reasoning behind amendments Nos. 204, 205 and 207, which do make happen our intentions with respect to the new provisions on access to information, which we discussed more broadly before Christmas and earlier today.

Tim Loughton: None of the amendments ''do make happen'', as the Minister puts it, what we would like to have happened a long time ago. This whole thing should never have happened in the first place. We will support the amendments. Doing so will make amendment No. 7, which is grouped with this, rather superfluous, so I shall not press it.
 The Minister has given a short explanation—great explanation would have been welcome—of the way in which the Registrar-General will withhold information on public policy grounds, to be challenged by the court. How many of the applications now going through adoption agencies does she envisage will be referred to the courts? I am pleased that the circumstance is exceptional, but what sort of circumstance are we talking about? How will it be monitored so that there is consistency across adoption agencies and the leave of the High Court is not overly sought? What numbers are we talking about? The process is expensive and cumbersome, so it would be useful to have more information about the nature of the exceptional circumstances and how the system of going through adoption agencies and producing birth certificates will work. While we are considering this set of amendments, the Minister might like to give us a few more practical examples. The intention is right, and we agree with the big U-turn that the Government have made, but we need a more detailed explanation of how the system will work. I shall be grateful if the Minister provides that.

Jacqui Smith: The provision does not exactly replicate the current position with respect to access to birth records. One of the problems that we highlighted was the fact that it would be possible for somebody, without having gone through an adoption agency, to make contact directly with the Registrar-General in order to receive information that would enable him to access his birth record. We are proposing, as a refinement of that process, that access be through the adoption agency, allowing—as we all agree—for referral in very exceptional circumstances to the High Court.
 To obtain a copy of one's birth records, one will have to provide the information necessary for the Registrar-General to make the links between one's birth record and one's record of adoption. That would produce the information to enable access to one's birth certificate. The change is that the Registrar-General will provide the adoption agency with the information to enable it either to pass on the information to the individual or, in rare cases when there could be cause for concern—I shall give examples in a moment—to consider it. 
 The Registrar-General has blocked the discharge of information in order to allow access to the birth certificate in one case since 1976, so the numbers are not significant. However, as we have previously argued, the matter could become marginally more significant in future. The exceptional circumstances with which we are concerned are those, for instance, that might entail a risk of death to the birth parents if the adopted person were able to identify them. The issue is not so much about numbers but the nature of 
 the risk that such exceptional circumstances might involve.

Tim Loughton: I appreciate fully what the Minister is saying, but who determines the risk? Is there not other provision in law, such as the issuing of injunctions or restraining orders and other action, if a risk is perceived? Every adopted child who came from an abusive home might be a risk to the parents in question, but only a tiny minority would prove to be so.

Jacqui Smith: The previous difficulty was that the Registrar-General could determine whether a risk existed only if it was obvious from the circumstances of the approach for information. Because the adoption agency has much better information and understanding about the circumstances of the adoption and the potential relationship between the birth parents and the adopted person, it is in a better position to evaluate the potential for risk.
 However, the agency will not be able to make a decision depriving the adopted person of their right to a birth record. It will be able only to apply to the High Court for permission not to disclose the information. The court will then consider whether it is justifiable to withhold the information that would enable the person to obtain access to their birth record. A pretty high hurdle will have to be cleared. The adoption agency and the court will have to consider risk and the appropriateness of withholding the information. 
 The Association of Directors of Social Services has provided some examples of cases of concern over the possibility of tracing and contacting individuals. One concerns an adopted person 
''who had reached 18 years of age, and sought information which would lead to him finding out the whereabouts of his birth parents as he wanted to 'kill them'. Apparently he had been badly abused as an infant and had a facial disfigurement. He said 'every day when I look in the mirror it reminds me of what they did to me and it makes me very angry'.
 In a second example, an adopted Asian girl 
''who was part of a very close knit family (which sought to exclude the authorities and any outsiders) was very seriously neglected as an infant over a significant period of time—indeed her doctors didn't think she would survive. The child was placed for adoption. Now that she is 18 she wants to trace her birth family: it is considered by the agency that she may be at risk if she does locate them as she is likely to be an extremely unwelcome visitor.''
 Another point that has been made is that the vast majority of adoptions happen well after birth, so people inevitably know who their birth parents are. Also, the vast majority of adoptions are open, which is generally considered to be good practice. We are attempting to make provision for rare cases and exceptional circumstances. 
 I have given information about the situation that has existed up until now, but I do not have an estimate of future figures. Perhaps the issue will never arise, but if it does, the circumstances might be so important as to necessitate the provisions in the clause. That justifies the balance that we have struck on access to birth records. There should be a right to access the information necessary to get one's birth record, and access should be through the adoption agency, which is best placed to know the particular circumstances. 
 However, in exceptional circumstances, the High Court should still be able to prevent that right from being exercised. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 205, in page 33, line 11, at end insert— 
'(a) the information within section 54(1A)(a), unless the High Court orders otherwise, 
 (b) any prescribed information disclosed to the adopters by the agency by virtue of section [Disclosing information during adoption process]. 
 (2A) The High Court may make an order under subsection (2)(a), on an application by the appropriate adoption agency, if satisfied that the circumstances are exceptional'.
 No. 206, in page 33, line 16, leave out 'or section 76 information'. 
 No. 207, in page 33, line 17, leave out subsections (5) and (6).—[Jacqui Smith.]

Jonathan Djanogly: I beg to move amendment No. 191, in page 33, line 23, at end add—
'(7) The natural parents of an adopted person shall at any time have the right to deposit, with the adoption agency who acted on the related adoption, written or electronic material which is addressed to the adopted person contained in sealed form. 
 (8) Upon receipt of such material referred to in subsection (7), the adoption agency shall have a duty to retain such material in sealed form— 
 (a) where the agency is made aware of the death of the adopted person, for a period of three years from the date of that death, or 
 (b) in all other cases, for a period of 80 years from the date of receipt.
(9) Upon written request from the adopted person made at any time following his or her having attained the age of 18 years or, following the death of the adopted person, upon written request from a personal representative of the adopted person, the adoption agency must forthwith release such material to the adopted person or his or her personal representative as the case may be. 
 (10) At the conclusion of the relevant time periods referred to in subsection (8)(a) and (b), the local authority shall destroy any material deposited pursuant to subsection (7).'.
 As the Minister has just said, most adoptions are open, and that is accepted good practice. However, for historical or contemporary reasons, that is sometimes not the case. Normally, that will be where there is no contact, perhaps because the child has been the subject of abuse. In addition, people involved in pre-1976 adoptions might not even know that they were adopted, while those who do so might not want contact with their natural parents. 
 Even in such problem cases, natural parents have certain basic rights, which should be set out in the Bill. As we discussed, they have no automatic right to information in such cases, but they should have a right in all circumstances to make information available to the adopted person. The amendment proposes a procedure to ensure that they have the right to deposit information about themselves so that the adopted person can access it on reaching maturity. That ties in with the next amendment, which suggests that adopted children should be told that they are adopted. However, the provision should not be retrospective, and there is no reason to tell someone who was adopted in 1945 that they were adopted, if 
 they had not been told before. In future, however, it would be best practice to do so. 
 The amendment would set up a procedure whereby information could be disclosed. It is based on a procedure that was used by the adoption agency with which I was involved as a councillor, and I can tell the Committee that it works very well. Ultimately, however, it would still be up to the adopted person to decide to seek the information.

Jacqui Smith: As the hon. Gentleman has pointed out, the amendment would add four new subsections to clause 58. They would provide for birth parents to be able to deposit sealed information with the adoption agency—information that the adopted child would have a right to see only once he had reached the age of 18.
 I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman's intention. It would be entirely laudable and appropriate with, for example, private or confidential information that could have no bearing on the child's upbringing but that the birth parents did not wish to share with the adoptive parents—a message, or photographs of the birth family whom the adopted child may not know, such as grandparents who may have died by the time that the adopted child had reached adulthood. However, it is not necessary to make such a provision in the Bill. To do so would prevent flexibility. 
 To return to a much rehearsed argument, a more practical approach would be for regulations to be made to allow adoption agencies to provide such a service. Indeed, clause 9 enables regulations to be made in respect of local authorities, voluntary adoption agencies and adoption support agencies. It provides a general power to make regulations for any purpose relating to the exercise by local authorities and voluntary adoption agencies of their functions in relation to adoption, and by adoption support agencies for their functions in relation to the provision of adoption support services. 
 Although the Government have some sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's intention, I hope that he will withdraw the amendment in light of my assurance that we shall consider how best to make such a provision through regulations made under clause 9, after due consultation on the details with adoption stakeholders.

Jonathan Djanogly: I thank the Minister for taking that approach. It seems that the meat of what is proposed will be accepted and included in regulations. I would have preferred to see it in the Bill, but the Government have accepted that it should somehow find its way into the legal process. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 235, in page 33, line 23, at end add—
'(7) On attaining the age of 18 an adopted adult shall be formally notified by the appropriate adoption agency that he was adopted.'.
 The amendment is all to do with a person's right to know that he is adopted. You may recall, Mr. 
 Stevenson, that in debate of an earlier amendment we wanted to make it a requirement that the birth parents would at least be told if their child, who had subsequently been adopted, had died. We felt that that was at least natural and humane, lest at a later stage those birth parents tried to seek out that child, could not access any information and, when they eventually tracked down the records, discovered that the child had died. That would be doubly cruel. We are attempting to insert a fundamental right into the clause. 
 During our proceedings, and in the preparation that many hon. Members have made in familiarising themselves with a subject with which many of us were not familiar, we have heard many extraordinary tales, cases and life histories of people who were adopted or gave up their children for adoption many years ago in circumstances that were not as equitable as one would hope for. 
 I have heard cases of people in their 70s discovering that they were adopted, often only when an adoptive parent, whom they had thought was a birth parent, had died. Adoptive parents who did not want to make it clear during their lifetime that they were not the natural birth parents have sometimes left notes for after their death, or the information has been released by friends or relatives in the know. That can come as a very traumatic revelation for the adopted children, especially if they have been living a pretence—although the intentions behind it may have been good—for many years. 
 It may be a doubly traumatic experience for adopted children if, when they try to search out their birth parents—as many do, for obvious reasons—they discover that they have died, as they are likely to have done if the discovery of the adoption has been made late in life. Those children will live their remaining years with the discovery that they are adopted, which may have come as an enormous shock, and that the people with whom they have grown up are not blood relatives. When they want to research into their birth relatives, if they are lucky enough to be able to trace them, they may find that they have died some years previously. 
 There is a case for making it a statutory right for adopted people to know that they are adopted. That is not an issue for those who are adopted at an age when they are quite aware that they are being removed from a birth family and placed with an adoptive family. However, a number of children are adopted at an age when they cannot assimilate that information, and that number will increase if this legislation is successful in promoting the number of children who are adopted out of care. In many cases, they will be told by responsible adoptive parents at an appropriate time and when all the adoption support services, to which we referred in earlier debates, are made available to them if appropriate, so that they can assimilate and cope with that information. 
 However, there still are—and I judge that there still will be—people who reach the age of 18 without for whatever reason being told by their adoptive parents 
 or people around them that they are adopted. They will live for a long time under the impression that their adoptive parents are their birth parents. Perhaps by accident they will find out that they are adopted, because certain facts that they come across do not stack up. It is a fundamental right that children, when they reach the age of 18 and become adults, should be entitled to that information, as long as all the necessary support goes with it. 
 The Children's Rights Alliance for England has stated that it is 
''a fundamental principle . . . that children should have the right to know they are adopted''—[Official Report, Special Standing Committee, November 2001; c. 314.]
 It goes on to quote from the United Nations convention on the rights of the child to back up that entitlement.

Julian Brazier: My hon. Friend has made a cogent case for the emotional side of the matter, and in most cases that is the more important side. However, I hope that he will also allude to the medical aspect, which we were discussing with reference to clauses considered earlier, such as when an adult is suffering from an illness. The provisions for being able to identify birth parents can kick in only at the point where an adopted child discovers that he or she is adopted.

Tim Loughton: That is a very important point. We are not talking about an enormous number of people, just those adoptive parents who, for the best of reasons in their view, are too protective towards an adoptive child. After they have died, a medical problem may emerge. We have ensured, although not quite to the extent that we wanted, that the child's medical history is passed to the adoptive parent, but there is no requirement for adoptive parents to ensure that the child is fully apprised of his or her medical condition. If the adoptive parents die and the child develops a medical condition and examines their medical history, that would be one way of finding out that they were not his or her birth parents. Lack of disclosure could lead to medical problems if there were a genetic history of such problems from a completely different family.
 I am sure that the amendment has problems. I am sure that it needs to be better worded, with many more safeguards attached to it. I think, however, that the Committee should consider the principle behind it. I am entirely happy for the Government, if they accept the principle of the amendment, to take it away and rewrite it, making a large part of it reliant on regulations. 
 The principle is so important that it should be taken up. It needs to be done sensibly, and I am certainly not suggesting that on an adopted child's 18th birthday they should automatically receive communication from some adoption equivalent of the tax office. I am not suggesting that along with their tax code and their 18th birthday card from their Member of Parliament they should receive a bit of paper saying, ''Congratulations. By the way, you're adopted.'' I am suggesting that the process be much more sensitive, which is why I alluded to the support services and counselling for which we have made provision in the Bill. 
 It is right that if, on reaching the age of 18, a person has not been told that they are adopted, that information should be made available to them, so that they can go through the rest of their lives knowing exactly where they come from. If they choose to pursue a line of inquiry based on the information given to them, they must know where to start on that path. That is a fundamental human right. On that basis, I commend the amendment to the Committee, although I would be delighted if the Minister bashed it around a bit if she accepted the general principle.

Jonathan Djanogly: As my hon. Friend said, there are relatively few cases of babies being adopted, and in the majority of adoptions, the children know who their parents are. However, babies are still adopted and the Bill may encourage that, as my hon. Friend also said. It is important that people should be informed of their adopted status when they reach the age of 18. That will do something to prevent people from experiencing the life-changing moment—we have discussed this several times—of finding out that they were adopted, and all the attendant emotions and problems.
 However, I hope that the provision will not apply retrospectively because that could create a host of unintended problems. It would be very unfortunate if hundreds of 70, 80 and 90-year-olds were suddenly to receive letters informing them of their adoptive status. That said, I support the amendment and note that it is drafted using the future tense, so I presume that it will not have retrospective effect.

Hilton Dawson: As the hon. Gentleman acknowledged, the amendment is pretty ghastly, but the principle behind it is sound. Although I do not expect that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to accept it, I hope that the Government will recognise the fundamental right of people to know that they were adopted.

Henry Bellingham: I certainly support the amendment because it is vital that any child who is adopted knows so at the earliest possible stage. If they are not told by their adoptive parents, they should be told when they reach the age of 18. It is unthinkable today that any adopted child should not be told at an early age, gradually, slowly and in an appropriate framework, that they are adopted. We hope that more very young babies will be adopted as a result of the legislation, so will the Minister say what the Government intend to do to improve the education and training of adoptive parents to ensure that they fully understand how important it is that adopted children are told the facts at an early age? How they are told is obviously also very important, although that is a side issue. However, some parents may not be able to cope and may find the matter too difficult to explain, so a few children may slip through the net. That is where the amendment would come in.

Elfyn Llwyd: I also fully agree with what has been said. It is a fundamental human right to know that one has been adopted, and such a provision should be in the Bill. I have followed the arguments; clearly the communication must be conducted sensitively. The
 scenario of letters arriving suddenly on people's 18th birthdays is rather ghastly. I am sure that the proposal is not meant in that way, although given the current state of the postal services, people might be considerably older than 18 by the time the letter arrives. [Laughter.] To be serious, the amendment is important. The wording might not find favour, but the principle is sound and I hope that the Minister will respond accordingly.

Jacqui Smith: In fact, the principle is a difficult one—[Interruption.] That is not to say that I do not have a lot of sympathy with what has been said and that I am not willing to consider the matter further. However, I think that I should spell out what I see as the difficulties, not only with the amendment but with the principle.
 The amendment would make it a duty for the adoption agency to inform the adopted person when he became an adult that he was adopted. The hon. Member for Huntingdon used the words ''best practice'' in relation to amendment No. 191, and many points that have been made on this amendment have related not to what should be an absolute statutory duty but to what all of us would agree is best practice. 
 Nowadays, the majority of children will know that they have been adopted. Under our adoption standards, where adoption is the plan for a child, he or she will be given clear explanations and information about adoption and will be prepared before joining a new family. Adoption plans will include details of the arrangements for maintaining links, including contact, with birth parents, wider birth family members and other people who are significant to the child. 
 If a child does not know that he has been adopted, our guidance to adopters emphasises that it is better if the adoptive parents explain that to him. It encourages them to be ready to do so when the child starts to take an interest in his origins. It states that openness is more likely to promote a secure relationship between the child and his adoptive parents. 
 The guidance also points out that when the adopted person reaches the age of 18, he will be entitled to a copy of his original birth certificate, as provided for by amendment No. 205. The adopted adult will also be entitled to access the prescribed information that was given by the agency to his adopters as part of the adoption process—although the hon. Member for Canterbury is right that that presupposes that the person knows that he is adopted. 
 However, I have a problem with the sometimes rather slick way in which people try to define a fundamental human right. I ask the Committee to consider the situation in which somebody was brought up by people who were not his parents, but who believed that they were. We need only to stretch our mind to soap operas to come up with such situations, but I am sure that they exist in reality as well. In those circumstances, there is not a fundamental human right to know that the people who are bringing up the child and who the child believes to be their parents are not their parents. It is not as easy as to say that it is a fundamental right to know who one's birth parents 
 are; life is not that simple. It could be that the nature of adoption is different and that we should consider whether people should know that they are adopted. I would be willing to think about that. 
 There is another problem with the amendment, as it would make it a duty for adoption agencies to intervene in a matter that we could argue is best left to the family to decide, and to the adopted adult to pursue, should he want to do so. We should remember that, when a child is adopted, he moves into a new family that should have the right to make decisions about him of the type that I would expect to make about my children. Hon. Members should be aware that providing such a duty or right—however we want to phrase it—would effectively be an intervention into family life, affecting decisions that some would argue should be most appropriately made by the family. 
 As I have pointed out, our guidance clearly encourages adoptive parents to be open with their adopted child about his origins, when they consider that he is ready. They will know that their child will be entitled to discover the facts for himself, should he want to when he becomes an adult.

Elfyn Llwyd: I follow what the Minister has said, but guidance to adoptive parents does not mean much because the parents may opt not to tell the child. As the hon. Member for Canterbury suggested, the words ''at his request'' in the clause clearly presuppose knowledge of adoption. The clause fails adopted children, as in many circumstances they will not know that they have been adopted. In some circumstances, alas, adoptive parents will not follow the Minister's guidelines. In that case, we are undermining an important principle. Further thought should be given to the issue.

Jacqui Smith: I disagree with the hon. Gentleman; there will not necessarily be many cases in which children do not know that they have been adopted. In a small number of cases, children may not know that they have been adopted because the adoptive parents have especially decided not to tell them. Which of us know what the circumstances might be in such a case? The implication of the proposal is that we overrule the decision taken by the adoptive parents not to tell their adopted child. The issue is more complicated than a blithe assertion about fundamental human rights. It will need careful consideration.

Hilton Dawson: Will my hon. Friend consider whether adoptive parents have the right to withhold such crucial information from their adopted child? Might a large part of the assessment of people as possible adopters be whether they are willing to allow such openness and honesty within the family so that the information could be made available at an appropriate time and in an appropriate way?

Jacqui Smith: I very much agree with my hon. Friend's second point. On his first point, I have a right not to inform my children about many things. That may be bad practice on my part, but it is my right as a parent.
 I cannot envisage a situation in which it would not be appropriate for someone to know that he was adopted, or for an adoptive family to tell its child that he was adopted. The amendment and the arguments for it made by some hon. Members suggest that every adopted person in all circumstances, regardless of any decisions made, should be told at the age of 18 that they had been adopted, not that it would be good practice in almost every circumstance.

Elfyn Llwyd: If the Minister argues that she can conceive of no situation that would justify denying the adopted child the knowledge that they were adopted, that guidance should surely have the force of law behind it. Either we should accept the amendment, or every adoptive parent should, as a matter of common practice, disclose to the child at an appropriate time and in the most sensitive way that they were adopted. The Minister is confusing the issue. She says that she can conceive of no reason to deny the child the knowledge that they were adopted, but then says that the amendment is no use because it gives a blanket right to obtain that knowledge. I cannot reconcile those two standpoints.

Jacqui Smith: The point that I was trying to make was that I agreed with hon. Members about what was likely to be best practice. However, I am also raising concerns about the extent to which such practice can be a right. I may have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman, but I think that he suggested that the Government should produce statutory legal guidance on how parents should relate to their children. That is a little problematic, and I am attempting to exemplify some of the problems with moving in the direction in which hon. Members are pushing me. I am not saying that I absolutely oppose the proposed measures, and I am willing go give them further consideration, but some of the assertions that have been made—I have not even got to the practicalities—suggest that hon. Members rather blithely believe that it is possible or desirable for the state to intervene in family life or in the relationship between parents and their children.
Mr. Llwyd rose—

Tim Loughton: Will the Minister give way?

Jacqui Smith: No, I shall give way to the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy.

Elfyn Llwyd: With respect, the Minister's argument is not very persuasive. I am not saying that we want the Government to interfere in family life—far from it. We want to enshrine a child's right to know their roots. That is the main aim, and we are looking for a way to achieve it. None of the Minister's arguments hitherto should prevent that.

Jacqui Smith: That is the point that we are discussing. What are the implications of enshrining such a right? I am attempting to exemplify some of them.

Tim Loughton: I am glad that my amendment has prompted such an interesting discussion. The Minister is discussing the fundamentally different issue of the state interfering in family life, and there are provisions in the European convention on human rights and the
 UN convention on the rights of the child to deal with that. We, however, are talking about a different issue, because the state will have legitimised the adopted child's relationship with their family. That will not be a natural birth relationship, so the state will have a right of involvement.

Jacqui Smith: That is an important point. That is why I said that it might be more fruitful to state that it was someone's fundamental human right to know that they had been through a legal process of adoption, rather than to know the nature of the people who were bringing them up. That may be the way forward.

Julian Brazier: As a Burkean Conservative who is not very impressed by a dialogue about rights as the best way to examine the obligations that make for civilised society, I rather sympathise with the Minister's point.
 The critical point is that we are dealing not with children, but with people who have reached the age of 18. Rather than telling people that they were adopted—that will already have happened in nearly every case—we might get round the problem by making it a statutory duty to make them aware of their right to see their birth certificate, which will include the information that they were adopted. Given that that will happen when they are 18, the birth parents will have plenty of time to get ready, and the information will appear slightly less ghastly when it comes through the post.

Jacqui Smith: Perhaps I have had a Burkean transformation over the Christmas break. I need to think about the suggestion made by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham, as I am not sure that it is the most appropriate way to go forward, and I see practical difficulties in implementation. The amendment would place an onerous duty on adoption agencies in that it would be necessary for them know that an adopted person was approaching 18 and was able and willing to make contact—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman, having made much of the resource implications of the proposals, now dismisses something that is potentially onerous.

Tim Loughton: This whole Bill is about making lifetime adoption work; it is about providing lifetime adoption services. If the adoption agency cannot even manage the not onerous task of working out when one of its previous charges reaches 18, then it is not doing its job very well. That is not a great responsibility or burden.

Jacqui Smith: That is the hon. Gentleman's view. I shall be interested to know whether adoption agencies consider it onerous or not. That might be one of the implications that we need to consider.

Jonathan Djanogly: On the method of informing the adopted child, it might be that the first approach should be made to the adoptive parents, to remind
 them that the child must know by the age of 18; after 18 years, they might have forgotten that they had to tell him. They should be reminded that they should take matters into their own hands rather than having the state bluntly inform the adopted person.

Jacqui Smith: I am pleased that, as the hon. Gentleman's intervention shows, the debate has forced us all to consider both the principles and the practicalities of the issue. Given that, perhaps I can reassure the Committee that the Government will consider in more detail both the practicalities and the principle and that I will give further information to Committee members before consideration of remaining stages on the Floor of the House. I hope that, on that basis, the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will feel able to withdraw the amendment, which is not quite ghastly, but might not achieve what we want to do.

Tim Loughton: I am flattered that the Minister thinks that the amendment is not ghastly. The hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) went slightly over the top in saying so. I did not suggest that it was ghastly. I implied that it might be flawed. Like all Opposition amendments, it is far from ghastly.
 It will be useful to address the outstanding points in Committee—I am grateful that the Minister is sympathetic to returning to them on Report, but I hope that her undertaking to come back to us before the remaining stages does not mean the night before—so that we have more time to consider what she might come up with. I would want to table amendments along these lines for consideration on Report, and they would be dependent on what the Government are thinking. 
 The Minister started by saying that the amendment was difficult. Then she said that she had some sympathy with the points raised, then she said that she would consider the matter further and then she said that it was a bit of a problem. Initially, I was slightly alarmed, because she seemed to pray in aid a case—I think that she is talking about the Slater family and what is currently going on with Kat, Zoe and Uncle Harry. I am concerned about the use of the example of what happens in ''EastEnders''. [Interruption.] I am very surprised that Labour Members raise the question of which soap opera is relevant. I should be alarmed if the Minister were citing those not exactly everyday instances that people have been watching on their screens in recent weeks as a good basis for not adopting a legitimate amendment— 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, the Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.